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 Russia’s “Contribution” to the  
Inception of the Eastern Partnership* 
 
VASILE ROTARU 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In May 2009, six former Soviet republics, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, signed in Prague the Joint Declaration of the 
Eastern Partnership (EaP), a European initiative meant to bring these countries 
closer to the EU. However, despite EU’s assurances that the EaP will benefit 
not only Europe, but also the former Soviet countries and Russia, by 
transforming the Eastern neighbours into a stable and prosperous common 
border, Moscow saw the initiative only to EU’s advantage, doubting that the 
former Soviet countries were so eager to join the EaP, considering the large 
number of costly reforms they had to implement. Thus, from its inception, 
Russian officials openly expressed their suspicion and concern towards the EaP. 
The Prime Minister Putin, for instance, characterized the initiative as “an 
alternative to NATO’s expansion to the East”, while for Russian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, it was “an attempt to extend the EU’s sphere of 
influence, including Belarus”1. 
The present paper will argue that the EaP was borne not only from the 
EU’s need for security and stability, but also from the desire of the former 
Soviet states who saw rapprochement with the EU as the only solution to 
preserve their sovereignty, threatened by a more and more assertive Russian 
foreign policy in the ‘near abroad’. Based on the assumption that Russia is a 
realist power, governed by the elites educated during the Cold War, which does 
not believe in win-win situations in international relations, the author have 
found appropriate to analyse Russian foreign policy in the former Soviet space 
before the launch of the EaP through the realist paradigm. 
                                                 
* This paper was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme 
for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social 
Fund, under theproject number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/134650 with the title “Doctoral and 
Postdoctoral Fellowships for Young Researchers in the Fields Political, Administrative 
Sciences, Communication Sciences and Sociology”. 
1
 EUOBSERVER, “EU Expanding its ‘Sphere of Influence’, Russia Says”, 21 March, 
2009, http://euobserver.com/foreign/27827, last accessed August 22, 2014. 
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“NEAR ABROAD” AND “COMMON 
NEIGHBOURHOOD” 
 
 
Despite a short period of rejection, the former Soviet republics, most of 
them gathered in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), remained one 
of the priorities of Moscow’s foreign policy, the interest towards these countries 
being clearly stated by every foreign policy concepts of the Russian Federation. 
Even the term “near abroad” (ближнее зарубежье) used in Russian diplomatic 
jargon with reference to the former Soviet republics, proves a special status 
“granted” to them. It may imply that these countries are not as foreign as others 
and therefore should be subject to different rules or treatment, or that Russia has 
“special rights” and responsibilities for maintaining security within this region2. 
An argument in this sense can be the January 1994 speech of the Russian 
foreign minister Kozyrev at the conference with the Baltic and the CIS 
ambassadors, where he claimed that “the CIS and the Baltic states constitutes 
the area in which Russia’s principal vital interests are concentrated ... [and] 
from which the main threats to its interest emanate. We should not withdraw from 
these regions which have been in the sphere of Russian interests for centuries”3. 
In general, Russia’s special interest in the “near abroad” results from 
economic factors, diaspora issue, and more important, from its own security 
needs. Obsessed with fear of being encircled by enemies, Moscow perceives the 
former Soviet republics paramount for protection of its own borders. Thus, as 
throughout history, Belarus proved to be the land through which the Western 
invaders made their way towards central Russia and Moscow, the Kremlin tries 
to keep this country as close as possible as a precaution. Ukraine is seen as the 
southwestern anchor and Russia’s Achilles’ heel. Moldova is for Ukraine what 
Ukraine is to Russia, therefore, if Ukraine cannot be defended, either cannot 
Russia4, the smallest former Soviet republic “earning” thus the strategic 
                                                 
2
 Mustafa Aydin, Neslihan Kaptanoglu, “Regionalization of Great Power Security – Near 
Abroad, broader Middle Asia, and European Neighbourhood”, in Globalization and 
Environment Challenges. Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and 
Peace, vol. 3, part. 8, Springer, 2008, p. 764. 
3
 Alexei Arbatov, “Russian Security Interests and Dilemmas: An Agenda for the Future”, in 
Alexei Arbatov, Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes, Lara Olson (eds.), Managing 
Conflict in the Former Soviet Union. Russian and American Perspectives, Center for 
Science and International Affairs John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University, Cambridge, 1997, p. 429. 
4
 George Friedman, “Geopolitical Journey, part 4: Moldova”, Stratfor, 2010, 
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101118_geopolitical_journey_part_4_moldova, last 
accessed June 11, 2014. 
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importance for Russia; while the Transcaucasus or the South Caucasus 
(Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) is a buffer zone and a rivalry area between 
Russia, Turkey, Iran and the USA. For the purpose of this paper, we will refer 
only to these six former Soviet republics form the “near abroad”. 
However, with the 2004-2007 EU enlargement, the “near abroad” became 
also EU’s neighbourhood, a reality, apparently, not very comfortable for the 
Kremlin. European proposal to call the countries residing between the EU and 
Russia “the common neighbourhood” in the road map for external security of 
the Four Common Spaces encountered Russia’s unilateral refusal. From the 
Kremlin’s perspective, this seemed to imply a certain challenge to its sphere of 
influence. Thus, at the meeting of the Permanent Partnership Council, in April 
2005, the two parties agreed that instead of “common neighbourhood”, the 
wording in the road map would be “countries adjacent to Russia” and “countries 
adjacent to the EU”, specifying thus clearly the separate nature of the links that 
the two actors had with their respective neighbourhoods5. The terms “common 
neighbourhood”, along with “shared neighbourhood” have, however entered the 
academic language and are widely used when referring to six former Soviet 
countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. 
On one side, the CIS countries are at the core of Russian foreign policy6 
and on the other side, it can appear that with the advantage of the intensive links 
created during a three generations common history and strong economic 
leverage Moscow has a clear advantage in front of the EU’s policy towards the 
“common neighbourhood” and the Kremlin’s task to keep its neighbour close 
should not be difficult at all. However, all the six countries addressed in this 
paper have contradicted this scenario. 
 
 
 
THE FIRST SIGNS OF DISOBEDIENCE  
IN THE “NEAR ABROAD” 
 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought Moscow a new dilemma: how 
to deal with the former Soviet territories. Before the disintegration of the USSR 
many intellectuals and Russian policy-makers were arguing that should Russia 
get rid of the other Soviet republics, its people’s standard of living was likely to 
elevate to that of Japan and Germany7. Thus, on the one hand it appeared that, 
                                                 
5
 Hiski Haukkala, The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership. The Limits of Post-Sovereignty in 
International Relations, Routledge, 2010, p. 137. 
6
 Olena Prystayko, “EU-Russia Common Neighbourrhood”, EU-Russia Centre, Brussels, 
2008, p. 59. 
7
 Tassos T. Fakiolas, Efstathios T. Fakiolas, “Russia’s Grand Strategic Alternatives at the Dawn 
of the New Century”, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol.17, no.3, 2004, p. 388. 
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now alone, Russia would not have to subsidize other republics and would get 
rid of a financial burden, allowing the country to integrate quickly into the 
Western economic community, and, on the other hand, the Kremlin was eager 
to get rid of neo-imperialist tendencies from its foreign policy arguing that an 
imperialist Russia could not be at the same time a democratic country8. Within 
this context, at its inception, the CIS was planned as an organization designed to 
make an easy civilized “divorce” of the former Soviet republics, this thinking 
fitting the liberal internationalism paradigm – the dominant of Russia’s foreign 
policy that time. 
However, the “Western honeymoon” did not last too long. The 
parliamentary elections of December 1993 represented a defeat of the liberal 
reformers and a shift of Russian foreign policy to more traditional realist 
concepts, promoted by the great power balancers9. The regret about lost 
influence in international politics translated quickly into a policy of keeping the 
former Soviet republics, except for the Baltics, within Russian sphere of 
influence10. The interest for the “near abroad” was officially proclaimed by the 
14 September 1995 presidential decree, “The strategic course of the Russian 
Federation with the CIS states”, that asserted the need to “intensify integration 
within the CIS and to improve coordination of Russian executive bodies’ 
activities in this direction”11. This interest was later assessed by the National 
Security Concept of the Russian Federation, approved by the president Yeltsin 
in December 1997. The document specifies that the cooperation within the CIS 
is a priority of Russian foreign policy and “deepening and development of 
relations with the CIS countries is the most important factor”12.The 
replacement, in January 1996, of Andrei Kozyrev by Yevgenii Primakov as 
Foreign Minister only confirmed the shift in Russian diplomacy from a liberal 
internationalism to a great power balancing paradigm, accompanied by 
Moscow’s desire of establishing its diplomatic and security hegemony 
throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union13.  
                                                 
8
 Mustafa Aydin, Neslihan Kaptanoglu, “Regionalization of Great Power…cit.”, p. 765. 
9
 Andrew C. Kuchins, Igor A. Zevelev, “Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change”, 
The Washington Quarterly, vol. 35, no.1, 2012, p. 153. 
10
 Michael Rywkin, “Russia and the Near Abroad Under Putin”, American Foreign Policy 
Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, vol.25, 
no.1, 2003, p. 4. 
11
 INTERFAX, “Bishkek Welcomes Moscow Decision on CIS Relations”, in Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Sullivan Paige (eds.), Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: 
Documents, Data, and Analysis, Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(Washington, D.C.), 1997, p. 201. 
12
 See Концепция национальной безопасности Российской Федерации 1997 [National 
Security Concept of the Russian Federation 1997], http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/ 
1.html, last accessed August 28, 2014. 
13
 Allen C. Lynch, “The Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990s”, Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol.18, no.1, 2002, p. 166. 
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Regarding the former Soviet republics of the “common neighbourhood”, 
Russia had cordial relations in that period only with Armenia and Belarus, with 
the later forming a union state since 1996. Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan 
attempted to promote Radical Westernizing orientations, in the manner of the 
three Baltic States with their independence, failing though and “getting” instead 
civil wars and loss of central control over separatist enclaves14. All three 
countries have reluctantly become the CIS members: fearing the economic 
blockade and hoping to solve the separatist conflict, Moldova signed the 
agreement of joining the CIS; however, the parliament ratified it only in April 
1994. Azerbaijan withdrew from the CIS in October 1992 and turned to Turkey 
for assistance in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, signing even a deal to build a new 
oil pipeline from Baku to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. However, the coup of 
June 1993, where many saw Russia’s fingerprints15, brought Heidar Aliev to 
power, a former Politburo member, who, in gratitude, rejoined the CIS in 
September 1993 and suspended the talks with Western companies on oil and 
pipeline development. Decided to remain outside the CIS, Georgia was also 
obliged to join the Russian-led organization in 199316. In the context of 
intensified fighting in Abkhazia and the resurgence of Gamsakhurdia forces in 
western Georgia, in both cases Russian hand being obviously seen17, and 
internationally isolated, Tbilisi joined the CIS and gave Russia five bases on its 
territory, in exchange for brokering peace with Abkhazia and help against 
Gamsakhurdia. 
Even the second biggest Slavic republic tried to consolidate its 
independence from Russia and restricted its involvement within the CIS to a 
“fake participation”. Kiev did not withdraw from the organization fearing 
territorial losses, president Yeltsin clearly stating that Russia would recognize 
Ukraine’s borders only within the CIS borders, however, the parliament has not 
ratified the CIS Charter, and, thus Ukraine is not de jure a the CIS member, its 
involvement in the organization being defined as “participant”18. Furthermore, 
the country had tried to establish an anti-Russian cordon sanitaire in 1993 under 
the label of a Baltic-Black Sea alliance of states lying between Russia and 
Germany19, and later became the catalyst of the GUAM. 
The unsuccessful military campaign in Chechnya in 1994-1996 showed 
Russia’s weakness and boosted the countries from the “near abroad”. 
Azerbaijan encouraged multinational companies to invest in its energy 
                                                 
14
 Taras Kuzio, “Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: The Emergence of GUUAM”, European 
Security, vol.9, no.2, 2000, p. 82. 
15
 Paul Kubicek, “Russian Foreign Policy and the West”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 114, 
no. 4, Winter, 1999-2000, p. 562. 
16
 Jyotsna Bakshi, “Russia's National Security Concepts and Military Doctrines: Continuity 
and Change”, Strategic Analysis, vol. 24, no.7, 2000, p. 1272. 
17
 Paul Kubicek, “Russian Foreign Policy…cit.”,  p. 563. 
18
 Taras Kuzio, “Geopolitical Pluralism…cit.”, p. 84. 
19
 Ibidem, p. 89. 
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resources in order to eliminate the economic dependency on Russia, Georgia 
was repeatedly accusing Russian peace-keepers of siding with Abkhazian 
separatists20, Moldova was striving to approach the EU, while Ukraine was 
backing the NATO expansion and upgraded relations with the NATO to a 
special partnership21. In 1997, these countries established in Strasbourg the 
GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), an organization that 
pursues integration into transatlantic and European structures in trying to 
diminish the dependence of its members on Russia22. The four former Soviet 
republics were seeking also to deprive the right of the CIS to represent them in 
international organizations, to prevent the use of economic levers by Russia to 
obtain strategic concessions through the CIS, and were opposing to the right of 
the CIS to resolve armed conflicts within the CIS23 Georgia and Azerbaijan 
looking instead to the USA to help them solve the internal protracted conflicts. 
The anti-Russian orientation of the GUAM was confirmed by the attendance of 
its members of the 50th anniversary the NATO summit in Washington in April 
1999, during the NATO’s bombardment in Serbia, where Uzbekistan joined the 
organization, transforming the acronym in the GUUAM. 
The inception of the GUAM/GUUAM was proving that Russia was 
steadily loosing influence in the former Soviet republics. “The reaching of the 
agreement on the Baku Ceyhan pipeline in November 1999 was confirming this 
assessment. Primakov stated on several occasions that the great power status did 
not come cheaply and that Russia should pay the economic price for 
reintegrating the old empire, directly or indirectly24. However, the Kremlin did 
not have the necessary economic and military capabilities for achieving its 
declared goals of consolidating Russia’s positions in the ‘near abroad”. 
 
 
 
“NEAR ABROAD” AT THE TURN 
OF THE MILLENNIUM 
 
 
When Putin came to power in December 1999, Russian foreign policy 
was in disarray. Relations with the West had deteriorated after the Kosovo war, 
while the ties with Russia’s neighbours had atrophied25. In one of his first public 
speeches, the new president announced that the relations with the CIS members 
                                                 
20
 Tassos T. Fakiolas, Efstathios T. Fakiolas, “Russia’s Grand Strategic…cit.”, p. 388. 
21
 Paul Kubicek, , “Russian Foreign Policy…cit.”, p. 561. 
22
 Michael Rywkin, “Russia and the Near Abroad…cit.”, p. 8. 
23
 Taras Kuzio, “Geopolitical Pluralism…cit.”, p. 94. 
24
 Allen C. Lynch, “The Evolution of Russian…cit.”, p. 167. 
25
 Angela E. Stent, “Restoration and Revolution in Putin's Foreign Policy”, Europe-Asia 
Studies, vol. 60, no. 6, 2008, p. 1090. 
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would be a priority for him, making clear that the former Soviet republics were 
of great geopolitical and geostrategic importance for the Kremlin. The interest 
towards the “near abroad” was also recorded by the National Security Concept 
of the Russian Federation, adopted on January 10, 2000. The document 
states the development of Russia’s relations with the CIS members in 
accordance with “principles of international law” and in the manner “of meeting 
Russia’s interests”26. 
The new president took a much more pragmatic attitude to the “near 
abroad” than his predecessor. Putin made it clear that the CIS was not going to 
be anymore a “posthumous version of the Soviet Union, a ‘politburo of equals’ 
with the leaders of the now independent republics seemingly enjoying equality 
with the Moscow boss”27, that the former Soviet republics have to comply with 
Russia’s security parameters and “they can no longer expect concessional 
treatment as with ‘buddy Yeltsin’ and get away with it”28, they had to meet 
“Russia’s interests”. This trend was reinforced a year later by the then Secretary 
of the Security Council, Sergei Ivanov, when he publicly acknowledged that 
previous attempts to integrate the CIS had come at a very high price, and that 
Russia must now abandon the integration project in favor of a ‘pragmatic’ 
course of bilateral relations. It has to be noticed that at that moment the CIS 
state’s debt to Russia had reached $5.5 billion29. 
Putin’s determination in its policy towards the CIS was enhanced by a 
combination of internal and external factors. The rising oil prices helped Russia 
to recover shortly from the economic crisis, the victory over Chechen 
insurgency restored confidence in country’s might, the centralization of power 
and the defeat of oligarchs stabilized the country, while the closeness between 
Russia and the USA after 11 September 2001 made Putin anticipate that in 
return for supporting the American anti-terrorist campaign Washington would 
recognize Russia’s sphere of influence in the “near abroad”, as long as, from the 
Kremlin’s perspective it is natural that great powers have special influence in 
their neighbourhood, as the USA does in the Latin America30. 
Thus, having the economic power and internationally consolidated 
positions, Putin took more decisive and stronger attitude in its relations with the 
former Soviet republics. The Kremlin put pressure on Georgia to allow Russian 
troops to pursue Chechen rebels into its territory, Moscow resisted to withdraw 
                                                 
26
 See Концепция национальной безопасности Российской Федерации 2000[National Security 
Concept of the Russian Federation 2000], http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-
osndoc.nsf/e2f289bea62097f9c325787a0034c255/b8d88f7503bc644fc325752e0047174b!
OpenDocument, last accessed August 28, 2014. 
27
 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia's Spheres of Interest, not Influence”, The Washington Quarterly, 
vol.32, no.4, 2009, p. 9. 
28
 Jyotsna Bakshi, “Russia's National Security…cit.”, p. 1283. 
29
 Andrei P. Tsygankov, “If Not by Tanks, Then by Banks? The Role of Soft Power in 
Putin's Foreign Policy”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol.58, no.7, 2006, p. 1082. 
30
 Angela E. Stent, “Restoration and Revolution…cit.”, p. 1095. 
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its forces from Moldova and Georgia, as it promised at the OSCE’s 1999 
conference, put pressure on the GUUAM and tried to “convince” Azerbaijan to 
give up the idea of construction of Baku-Ceyhan pipeline31. Putin showed also 
his readiness to play the diaspora card in Moldova and Ukraine to justify his 
efforts to gain influence. In June 2000, Russian president declared that “Russia 
is interested in Moldova being a territorially whole, independent state. But this 
cannot be achieved unless the interests of all population groups, including [the] 
Transdniester population, are observed”32. Furthermore, the threat of 
secessionism was enforced by the December 17, 2001, constitutional law “On 
the procedure for the admittance/acceptance to the Russian Federation and the 
founding within its framework of a New Subject of the Russian Federation” ‒ a 
clear warning for the former Soviet republics that Moscow could decide to 
“admit” Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, or some other regions within its 
own borders33.  
In addition, where was possible, Putin has tried to replace pro-Western 
politicians in the CIS countries with pro-Moscow figures. Thus, Moscow 
pressured Kiev to fire the foreign minister Tarasyuk, in November 2000 and the 
prime-minister Yushchenko, in May 2001 and appointed the former chairman of 
Gazprom and former Russian prime-minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
ambassador to Kiev with the aim of taking advantage of Ukraine’s main 
economic weakness – the dependence on Russian energy34. The FSB, Russian 
intelligence service, has also helped Ukrainian police arrest the former energy 
minster and opposition leader Iulia Tymoshenko, in February 2001, on the basis 
of five-year-old bribery charges35. Within this context of Russia’s intrusion in 
domestic policies of the “near abroad” we can assume that Moscow must have 
had also a “contribution” in the discredit of Chișinău’s pro-European Sturza 
Government and in the victory of pro-Russian Party of Communists of Republic 
of Moldova in 2001 parliamentary elections. 
These examples are a clear reflection of the fact that Russia did not 
regard the former Soviet republics as full-fledged independent states to be dealt 
with on an equal basis but as ‘subjects’ of its sphere of influence36. The project 
of a liberal empire, announced by Anatoly Chubais in 2003 comes only to 
support this statement. The former head of Russia’s privatization presented the 
liberal empire as the only viable project for securing market and democratic 
reforms in the CIS, assuming that the West would endorse it. In Chubais’ 
                                                 
31
  Michael Rywkin, “Russia and the Near…cit.”, p. 9. 
32
 Stephen J. Blank, “Putin's Twelve-Step Program”, The Washington Quarterly, vol.25, 
no.1, 2002, p.155. 
33
 Gennadi Kurdiukov, Katlijn Malfliet, “Integration by Absorption: New Subjects to the 
Russian Federation”, in Katlijn Malfliet, Lien Verpoest, Evgeny Vinokurov (eds.), The 
CIS, the EU and Russia. The Challenges of Integration, Palgrave Macmilan, 2007, p. 208. 
34
 Michael Rywkin, “Russia and the Near…cit.”, p. 9. 
35
 Stephen J. Blank, “Putin's Twelve-Step…cit.”, p. 154. 
36
 Michael Rywkin, “Russia and the Near…cit.”, p. 4. 
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opinion, in return for a free market and a stable Russia and surrounding region, 
the West would have to recognize Russia’s sphere of influence37. And even if 
the “colour revolutions” prevented the building of the liberal empire, elements 
of this projects, like “promotion of the expansion of domestic business in the 
neighbouring countries both in trade and in the acquisition and development of 
assets”, left their mark on Moscow’s policy towards the “near abroad”.  
 
 
 
THE BLOODLESS WARS 
 
 
The “rose revolution” in Georgia and the “orange revolution” in Ukraine 
were a clear reflection of the will of former Soviet republics to break with their 
recent past and to engage in an effective reform process that would enable their 
rapprochement with the West. However, the defeat of pro-Russian leaders in 
Tbilisi and Kiev came as a real political earthquake for Moscow. The most 
dramatic failure was perceived in Ukraine, where the Kremlin poured 
substantial resources into supporting Yanukovich, president Kuchma’s 
designated heir38. For Putin such behavior of the near abroad was unacceptable. 
Seeing the West’s involvement in the “colour revolutions” and aware of the 
strategic importance of the “near abroad”, especially for the export of oil and 
gas – the key of Russia’s powerful revival, Moscow sought to secure its rising 
revenues and strengthen its positions even in the friendly-neighbour republics 
so that to prevent any new “color” uprising. What followed was labeled by 
many scholars as economization of Russian foreign policy, translated into the 
increasing of gas price for the former Soviet republics, acquisition of strategic 
infrastructure of these states through assets-for-debt agreements and trade 
blackmail; and a more active use of protracted separatist conflicts in the “near 
abroad” in order to put more pressure on the central “disobedient” governments. 
 
 
The “Energodiplomacy” in the “Near Abroad” 
 
What the USSR sought to achieve with nuclear weapons, Russia under 
Putin was trying to achieve with oil and gas – increased political influence over 
its neighbours and the EU39. The clearest example in this sense is the “gas 
offensive” on “near abroad” that followed the “colour revolutions”. In fact the 
                                                 
37
 Anatolii Chubais, “Missiya Rossii v XXI veke”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1st October 2003, 
http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2003-10-01/1_mission.html, last accessed May 3, 2014. 
38
 Angela E. Stent, “Restoration and Revolution…cit.”, p. 1100. 
39
 Ibidem, p.1094. 
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idea of using energy weapons for influencing the post Soviet countries did not 
appear after the popular revolts in Georgia and Ukraine. It was developed by the 
doctrine of Liberal Empire but has been implemented in all countries analyzed in 
the present paper immediately after the democratic revolutions in the “near abroad”. 
Thus, shortly after Yushchenko was installed as president, Russia, 
through the state-owned Gazprom, demanded Ukraine sharp increased price for 
gas, from $50 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) to $160 per tcm and then to $230 
per tcm, arguing the necessity of adjustment to the current market price. Kiev 
resisted, motivating that an existing agreement guaranteed a low price until 
200940. Consequently, on 31 December 2005, Gazprom cut off natural gas 
supplies to Ukraine, which made Kiev divert some gas transiting the country to 
the European customers to its own use. After protests of the European 
governments, Gazprom resumed gas deliveries on January 2, and two days later 
a preliminary agreement between Gazprom and Ukraine was reached. In 2007, 
the two parts agreed to gradually increase the price of Russian gas supplied to 
Ukraine over the next five years, until it reached the world market price41. 
However, the frictions have resumed shortly. After the narrow victory of pro-
Western parties in the Ukrainian September 2007 parliamentary elections, 
Gazprom suddenly asked Ukraine to pay its $ 1.3 billion gas debts in less than a 
month; in March 2008 Gazprom reduced gas supplies by 50% because of the 
disagreement on the price Ukraine should have paid for gas delivered in January 
and February 2008, the supplies being restored after two days; while on January 
1, 2009, Russia stopped gas supplies to Ukraine, and on January 6 ‒ all 
deliveries through Ukraine to the rest of Europe, causing the worst gas crisis up 
then. It was only on January 18 that Russia and Ukraine reached an agreement 
and the gas supplies to Europe was resumed on January 20, after 13 days of 
cold winter. 
Moldova was also affected by the 2005-2006 Russian “gas offensive”. At 
the end of 2005, Gazprom announced Moldovan authorities that it intended to 
double the price of natural gas. As Chișinău opposed, on January 1, 2006, 
Gazprom halted natural gas supply to Moldova. The crisis lasted until mid-
January, when the two sides agreed to increase the price for Moldovan 
recipients from $80 per tcm to $110 per tcm, after which it rose to $160 per tcm, 
explained by some specialist as a “punishment” for Chișinău’s pro-Western 
policy42. In December 2006 the two sides reached an agreement, which 
                                                 
40
 Jim Nichol, Steven Woehrel, Bernard A. Gelb, “Russia’s Cutoff of Natural Gas to 
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provided that Moldova would pay $170 per tcm in 2007 and the price would 
gradually increase up to $250 pet tcm in 2011. In addition, Gazprom received 
13% Transnistria’s stake in MoldovaGaz, increasing thus the percentage of its 
shares in Moldova’s owner of natural gas pipelines to 63.4%. 
Much the same pattern followed the gas dispute in Georgia in 2006. At 
the end of 2005 Gazprom announced Tbilisi of its intentions to substantially 
increase the price of gas. In January 2006 unknown saboteurs bombed Tbilisi 
Mozdok pipeline in North Ossetia, stopping temporarily gas supplies to 
Georgia. The incident coincided with the explosion on an electricity supply line 
near Georgian border and was labeled as a deliberate act of sabotage by 
Georgian president Saakashvilli who insinuated a link between the explosions 
and the dispute over gas prices43. In November 2006, Gazprom threaten Tbilisi 
that it would cut off gas supplies by the end of the year if Georgia did not agree 
to an increased price or sold its main gas pipeline to Gazprom44. However, in 
mid-2006, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline was completed, and in March 
2007, the South Caucasus gas pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum) started 
transporting gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia, allowing Tbilisi to 
lessen its dependence on Russia. 
Gazprom attempts to impose higher prices to Azerbaijan made Baku 
decide not to import natural gas from Russia anymore. In addition, the State Oil 
Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) halted on January 1, 2007, its 
oil exports to Russia via Baku-Novorossiisk pipeline for three months, arguing 
that the oil was needed to be used as fuel for Azerbaijani power stations that 
used to ran on Russian gas45. 
 Neither the “friendly” neighbours have escaped Russian gas pressure. In 
January 2006, Armenia was announced by Gazprom of its intentions to double 
the price of Russian gas, from $56 per tcm to $110 per tcm. Depending totally 
on Russian supplies, in May, the country ceded various energy assets to Russian 
firms as partial payment for this price increase and in October the same year, 
Armenian officials announced that Gazprom would assume management control 
of the Iranian-Armenian gas pipeline, then under construction. 
The last neighbour encountering Russian “economization” of foreign 
policy was Belarus. Member of the state union, the most loyal former Soviet 
republic used to receive natural gas at Russia’s domestic prices. However, in 
April 2006, deputy CEO of Gazprom declared that the rate of natural gas 
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supplied to Belarus “should be at least three times higher”46, meaning around 
$140 per tcm. Belarus was threatened with a cut off in supplies on January 1, 
2007, if did not agree to pay the higher price. The gas shutoff was prevented by 
an agreement reached just hours before the deadline, on December 31, 2006. 
Belarus accepted an increase in the price of gas from $46, 68 per tcm to $100 
per tcm and a gradually adjustment, reaching the world market levels in 2011. 
Additionally, Belarus agreed to sell Gazprom 50 percent of the stock in 
Beltransgaz, the Belarusian gas pipeline company47.  
However, the conflict between the two countries erupted again a week 
after over the price of oil. The dispute was started by Moscow’s decision to 
impose a duty of $180 per ton on oil exports to Belarus. In response, Minsk 
decided to increase the custom duties on the transport of Russian oil through 
Belarus to $45 per ton. Russia stopped pumping oil to Europe via Druzba 
pipeline, which crosses Belarus, accusing its neighbour of siphoning off oil. 
After negotiations, Belarus cancelled its customs duties on oil, while Russia 
reduced the export customs for oil delivered to Belarus from $180 to $53 per tcm. 
Within the context of “energodiplomacy” fit as well the asset-for-debt 
strategy. Initiated during Putin’s fist term, this policy consists of forcing the 
indebted CIS countries to cede Russia their strategic assets in exchange for 
debts. At the beginning it was the electricity production and distribution of 
countries in the “near abroad” that were affected. Through this strategy, the 
Russian Unified Energy Systems (UES), headed by Anatoly Chubais, the author 
of the liberal empire theory, acquired 75% share in a Georgian electricity 
distribution company, obtained the right to manage several power plants and 
owned 50% of the Transenergy nuclear power plant and all of the Mitkvari 
power plant. In Armenia, UES came to control 100% of the country’s electricity 
production and distribution48. 
The policy of assets-for-debt was used more effectively during 2005-
2006 gas offensive. With strong energy leverage during the cold winter, 
Moscow has succeeded in increasing its stake in Moldova’s pipeline system, 
bought the main Georgian gas pipeline, took control over the under construction 
Iranian-Armenian pipeline and received half of the stock in Belarusian pipeline 
company (in 2011, Russia took total control over Belarusian pipeline system). 
Of course, these actions have strengthened Russia’s positions in the “near 
abroad” allowing Moscow to put more pressure on the governments of the 
former Soviet republics, on the other side, however, the gas wars and the 
acquisition of strategic assets have disappointed the ordinary people from these 
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countries, providing the necessary public support to their political leaders in the 
decision of reorienting the foreign policy towards the West. 
 
 
From “Food Wars” to Deportations 
 
Within the context of economization of Russian foreign policy the “food 
wars” with the former Soviet republics played an important role. Aiming to put 
pressure on its neighbours the Kremlin did not hesitate to hit on the main 
exports of these countries. And the imposition of periodic trade embargos and 
other economic sanctions on countries dependent on Russian market access can 
be a strong source of political pressure49. 
Still affected by the gas wars, in March 2006, Russia put an import ban 
on both Moldovan and Georgian wines, on grounds that they contained 
dangerous substances; in particular pesticides and hard metals, and that many 
drinks were falsified. At that moment both Moldova and Georgia were 
depended on the proportion of 80-90% on Russian market for they total wine 
export50. Five weeks later, Russia banned another Georgia’s prominent export – 
Borjomi and Nabeglavi mineral water accusing that the products failed to meet 
water purity standards. This embargos came within the context of Georgia’s 
efforts to join NATO and Moldova’s pro-Western orientation. Furthermore, 
Putin had apparently inserted the wine trade as an issue in the negotiations with 
Moldova on Transnistrian conflict51. In late 2007, amid warming of relations 
between Chișinău and Moscow, Russia lifted the ban on Moldovan wine, the 
embargo on Georgian products remaining in force, however. 
Also in 2006, Russia boycotted Belarusian sugar, accusing Minsk of 
“dumpling” by exporting cheap sugar made from imported Cuban sugar cane, 
arguing that the agreements with Russia on the Belarusian sugar exports applied 
only to the sugar made of the local beets52. The dispute ended in 2007, when 
Belarus agreed to cut its exports of sugar to the Russian market. 
That Russian “food wars” had punitive character and only apparent 
consumer protection aims is proved also by their most recent forms. One month 
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after the launch of the EaP, Russia imposed a ban on Belarusian milk and dairy 
products, citing Belarus’ failure to meet Russian new sanitary regulations. In 
August 2010, a new ban was introduced on imports on Moldovan wine, ahead 
of parliamentary elections, planned in autumn; in February 2012, Ukrainian 
cheese was banned on Russian market because would have contained palm oil; 
while in March 2012, Russia threatened to restrict Azerbaijani exports of fruits and 
vegetables, in the context of negotiations of a Russian radar station on it territory. 
In the category of economic wars fits also the 2006 deportation of 
Georgians from Russia. As retaliation to the arresting by Georgian authorities of 
four Russian citizens on charges of espionage in September 2006, the Kremlin 
suspended transport and communication links to Georgia and stopped issuing 
visas to Georgian citizens, aiming at preventing Georgian migrant workers in 
Russia from sending money back home. This decision was shortly followed by 
a campaign of expelling Georgians who were in Russia illegally and 
discrediting of those who remained, the anti-Georgian media campaign 
provoking discriminatory actions against Georgian owners of food and 
entertainment venues in Russian cities. There was little doubt that these 
sanctions were intended to encourage Georgian people to bring down 
Saakashvilli53. Giving the fact that at that time it was estimated that more than a 
fifth of Georgia’s 4.4 million people (almost 1 million) were working in 
Russia54 their remittances sent home reaching $1 billion annually, that 
represented 20-25% of Georgia’s GDP55, Russia’s actions could not be 
interpreted only as attempts to destabilize Georgia. 
 
 
 
THE SECESSIONIST CARD 
 
 
As one can notice, Russian offensive towards the former Soviet republics 
became more assertive, better coordinated and quickly triggered after the “colour 
revolutions”. This trend was already hinted in April 2005, when president Putin 
addressed Russian nation telling that the demise of the Soviet Union was the 
greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century, setting thus, the course of Russian 
foreign policy towards great power status including neo-imperialist aspirations56. 
As some analysts have pointed out, after the “colour revolutions”, Russia has 
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abandoned the idea of CIS as a liberal trade community and there hasbeen a 
consistent effort to reassert Russia’s traditional sphere of influence57. The protracted 
conflicts in the former Soviet republics played an important role in this context. 
For the Kremlin the secessionist conflicts are an important instrument for 
keeping its grip on the “near abroad”. Moscow uses them in order to prevent the 
advent of any hostile bloc or organization towards its borders and put a great 
pressure on the former Soviet republics. On the one side, the secessionist 
regions in the “near abroad” are characterized by a general lack of democratic 
progress. The external (Russian) support is the only one that keeps them alive 
and thriving, the breakaway regions being aware of their dependence on this 
support, and consequently, allows Moscow a significant say on their internal 
matters. Hence, Russian support to the secessionist regions creates increasingly 
“undemocratic reserved policy domains” within the former Soviet republics 
that severely restrict the effective power to rule of the democratically elected 
central governments of the former Soviet republics58. On the other side neither 
the NATO nor the EU are willing to integrate states with internal territorial disputes. 
Therefore, supporting the secessionist conflicts in the former Soviet republics, 
Moscow keeps a great leverage over both internal and external policies 
of its neighbours.  
Thus, on 25-27 January 2005, just days after the end of the “orange 
revolution”, the leaders of secessionist Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia met 
in Moscow with the Russian First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Valery 
Loshchinin and with Duma chairman, Boris Gryzlov. Two months later, leaders 
of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh came again to Moscow, 
where met separately with the Russian presidential administration, government, 
military and Duma officials. These meetings took place not at all at random, on the 
contrary, they were meant to warn the former Soviet republics and reassess Moscow’s 
privileged role in negotiations of protracted conflicts in Moldova and Caucasus. 
Seeing its geopolitical interests endangered in Ukraine after the “orange 
revolution”, Russia sought to warm the separatist card in Crimea too. The Kremlin 
intensified its passportization policy and three extremist pro-Russian youth 
movements opened branches in Ukrainian peninsula: the Eurasian Youth Union – a 
subdivision of the international movement founded by Russian nationalist Alexander 
Dugin, a Moscow State University professor with close ties to the Kremlin59; Proryv 
and Nashy, both with branches in Transnistria, Ankhazia and South Ossetia.  
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ESTRANGING THE “NEAR ABROAD”,  
PROPELLING THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP 
 
 
The former Soviet space is perceived by the Kremlin as very important 
for its security and energy resources and infrastructure. Therefore, Moscow has 
sought to prevent the former Soviet countries from approaching with the West, 
especially with the United States and to secure its energy transition to the 
European market. However, Russian assertive policy towards the “near abroad”, 
especially during Putin’s second term, did not reach fully the expected results. If 
Russia succeeded in imposing itself on its neighbours using especially 
economic tools, there were the same means that estranged in fact the former 
Soviet republics from Moscow, making them look to the West for guarantors of 
their sovereignty. 
Russia’s oil and gas exports have been the main factors of the country’s 
economic revival, and reaffirmation as a great power on international arena. 
Therefore, the ensuring of unimpeded transit for its gas and oil across the 
territories of the former Soviet republics to the European Union in particular, 
preventing the construction of pipelines to the EU outside its territory and to 
gain access to the CIS countries own energy and other important resources 
represent paramount issues for Russia’s might and stability, as loosing its 
position on the European market and the monopoly on export routes would put 
Russia in the position of competing with other export outlets60. On the other 
side, by raising gas prices for the former Soviet republics, even for the most 
loyal one, Russia sought to show its neighbours “who is the boss” in the region, 
to pump more money into the federal budget and to force these countries to sell 
Russia their strategic assets, especially in the energy area. However, Moscow’s 
heavy handedness undercuts its influence with its neighbours pushing them to 
seek closer relations with the West. The gas offensive did not but worried the 
former Soviet republics that Russia may use their energy dependency to 
interfere in their domestic affairs or to put pressure on them to make more and 
more foreign policy concessions61. As a result, the aggressive Russian 
“energodiplomacy” towards Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Belarus gave an added momentum to these countries’ interest in forging 
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closer relations with NATO, the EU and the US62, hoping that that way could 
strengthen their sovereignty. Gazprom’s demands for a gas price hike, for 
instance, have prompted unprecedented debates in Armenia about the value of 
the strategic partnership with Russia and shocked Belarus, setting practically the stage 
for these countries for joining the EaP, an initiative not regarded well by Russia. 
Even more dangerous was perceived Moscow’s asset-for-debt strategy. 
While Russia’s policy of buying strategic assets in the CIS countries helps the 
Kremlin to play the modern integration game – political integration as a 
consequence of economic integration and not vice versa, a strategy that allows 
Russian capital to simply swallow economies of the former Soviet republics63‒ 
this fact rouse concerns of the former Soviet republics that by controlling 
strategic assets in their countries, Russia would be able to manipulate the 
internal political situation, restraining thus their sovereignty. The situation was 
getting more tense giving the fact that all these states have built their statehood 
in opposition to Russia64 and in the context of Putin’s declaration about the 
collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical disaster of the century, 
read by many analysts as a “[setting] of the course of Russian foreign policy 
toward great power status including neo-imperialist aspirations”65, there were 
no doubts that the Kremlin would not hesitate to infringe their sovereignty 
whenever considers its interest at stake. 
As a result, even Putin’s ties with Lukashenko became testy. The political 
union between Russia and Belarus did not move closer to realization, the ties 
with Moldova damaged too, Voronin declaring officially his European 
aspirations, Azerbaijan continued to carefully establish closer relations with the 
West (supplied cheap energy to Georgia, participated in the GUAM, cooperated 
militarily with the United States) taking care, at the same time, not to exacerbate 
friction with Russia66, Ukraine and Georgia were pushing for the NATO 
membership and expressed European aspiration, while Armenia was 
questioning the strategic partnership with Russia.  
Russia’s relationship with the “near abroad” was stained even more by 
the “economic wars”. While the increase of gas prices could have been 
“accepted” as a “need” to regulate the relations of independency between 
Russia and the CIS countries, the adjustment to the market price being a proof 
of strictly economic cooperation, in the case of the “food wars” or the expulsion 
of Georgians from Russia no one doubted the punitive nature of those actions. 
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For the affected countries those were attempts of state destabilizing, while for 
the other former Soviet republics – warnings that Russia has no hesitation to use 
any means for securing its loyalty even if it meant destabilizing or alteration of 
its neighbours sovereignty. These economic wars estranged even Russia’s union 
partner. Thus, in Belarus, the dictatorial and culturally Soviet president 
Lukashenko became father of national independence67. During the milk war, he 
accused Russia of trying to take control of Belarus’ industries and destroy its 
sovereignty adding that a confederation with Russia and Belarus would create 
“another Chechnya”, suggesting that Belarus would use military force to defend 
its independence68, and that “Belarus is conducting its own independent domestic 
and foreign policy” and that it “did not want to become an appendage of Russia, particularly 
an economic one”, according to a member of Belarusian Parliament69. 
Along with the economic problems generated by trade embargos, the 
energy dependence and discredit of transit countries, the possession of strategic 
assets in the near abroad, Russian “game” in the protracted conflicts had also 
the opposite result than the alienation of the former Soviet republics from the 
West. The Kozak memorandum, Russian proposal of managing Transnistrian 
issue, was the factor that determined Moldovan Communist government to U-
turn the country’s foreign policy towards the European integration. Showing 
clearly how little price Moscow was putting on Moldova’s sovereignty through 
the Kremlin’s plan of asymmetric federalization of the former soviet republic70, 
Russia had nothing but determined Chișinău to look for guarantors of its 
independence. The same reaction had Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
especially after the 2006 meetings of the separatist leaders in Moscow. Being 
clear that Russia is using the separatist conflicts against the central governments 
of the former Soviet republics, these countries sought rapprochement with 
NATO and the EU for solving their protracted conflicts. 
The estrangement of the “near abroad” and the former Soviet republics’ 
choice of rapprochement with the West coincided with the EU’s growing 
interest towards this region. The 2004-2007 enlargements brought new Eastern 
neighbours on the EU’s borders, and made the EU a Black Sea power. However 
not only did this extension grow the EU’ influence and importance on the 
international arena, but it brought also new threats and responsibilities, as “what 
happens in the countries in Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus affects the 
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European Union […] their security, stability and prosperity increasingly impact 
on the EU’s” (see EEAS). Therefore, in order to ensure its own security 
Brussels had to ensure stable governance on its borders, and thus had to address 
the threats that came from the new Eastern neighbours, such as poverty, 
migration, transnational crime, etc.71. Thus, in 2004, the EU launched the 
European Neighbourhood Policy “with the objective of avoiding the emergence 
of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and [the new] neighbours and 
instead strengthened the prosperity, stability and security of all” (European 
Commission), seeking thus to extend a European “postmodern” security 
community across the EU and create a “ring of well governed countries”.  
The commitment to the European ideal, principles and community of 
values of the “near abroad” highlighted by the “color revolutions” along with 
Russia’s aggressive offensive that followed, put the EU in front of the need for 
a more focused strategy on the Eastern neighbours. Russia’s attempts to 
destabilize the economies of these countries and the danger of warning of the 
“frozen conflicts” put at risk the stability and security of the EU. Furthermore, 
the 2008 Georgian War put the former Soviet republics in front of a great 
dilemma: how to ensure their own security72, and at the same time alerted the 
EU about how far is the Kremlin ready to go in its policies towards the ‘near 
abroad’. It was obvious that a greater involvement of Brussels in the Eastern 
neighbourhood was both expected and needed. Within this context, the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) initiative fitted perfectly.  
Thus, initiated by Poland and Sweden before the Georgia War, the EaP 
was rushed by the events of August 2008. With the aim to “deepen and to 
intensify bilateral relations between the EU and the partner countries” (Council 
of European Union 2009), marking “a step change in relations with these 
partners […] responding to the need for a clearer signal of EU commitment”73 
towards the Eastern neighbours, the EaP was launched on May 7, 2009, in 
Prague. The initiative was immediately criticized by Moscow, Russian foreign 
minister, Sergei Lavrov, accusing the EU of trying to carve out a new sphere of 
influence in Russia’s region of “privileged interests”. Brussels’ answer that the 
EaP is not an anti-Russian alliance or a sphere of influence, and that the EU “is 
responding to the demands of [its Eastern neighbours]”74 did not convince Moscow. 
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For the Kremlin the EU became a serious competitor in the “near abroad”. 
Until the launch of the EaP, Moscow saw the EU as a relatively benign 
international organization, a strategic ally in its desire for a multipolar world. 
More concerned of the USA’s foreign policy, Russia saw the EU enlargement 
as a fairly positive process, which would have provided an alternative to the 
NATO’s expansion75. The Kremlin saw American hand in what happened in the 
“near abroad” after 2000, reading of the “color revolutions” as largely U.S. 
conspiratorial activities meant to drastically reduce Russia’s influence in the 
neighbourhood, and expand the United States76. With the EaP, however, 
Moscow became much more worried about the EU. The speed, with which the 
27 EU members mobilized to launch the EaP and the strengthening of the EU 
after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, put Russia on thoughts. For 
Moscow, the EU became now the major rival in the “near abroad”, especially 
provided that “the EU is the only great power with unsettled borders”77.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has sought to keep its 
influence in the “near abroad” as a guarantee of its own security and as a need 
for being “not just a big nation-state” but “a pole in a multipolar world”78. The 
domestic problems and the lack of resources undermined this aim in the ’90s 
though. It was only after 2000 that Moscow had the necessary means and 
decided to regain the lost positions. However, the gas wars, the acquisition of 
the strategic assets of the former Soviet republics, the trade boycotts, the 
political discourse about the fall of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical 
catastrophe of the century put on alert both the countries of the “near abroad” 
and the EU about Russia’s attempts of rebuilding its empire, not necessarily by 
drawing new physical borders but by strengthening the dependence of its neighbours. 
Translated in asymmetric federalization plans (the Kozak memorandum), 
energy blackmail or attempts of economic disruptions, the imperial recovery 
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trend sought to discredit the former Soviet republics, presenting them as failed 
states, and create the circumstances that allow Russia to easily influence their 
internal and external policies. Of course, the economic dependency of the “near 
abroad”, the strong links created during a three generations common history, the 
readiness of using great financial resources for external purposes, give Russia 
an advantage in front of the EU in the relationship with the “common 
neighbourhood”, however, abusing of these means have nothing but raised 
suspicion in the former Soviet republics about Russia’s viability as strategic partner. 
Furthermore, instead of approaching its neighbours the “energodiplomacy” or 
the economic wars made the former Soviet republics look for rapprochement 
with the EU and the NATO, as guarantors of their sovereignty. Within this 
context, the EaP emerged not only from the EU’s need of building “a ring of friends” 
around its Eastern borders, but in response to the demands of the countries from 
the “common neighbourhood” for greater EU’s involvement in this area. 
